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世界を見る眼 
【特集】クルド問題についての緊急レポート 
The Rise of the Kurds in the Syrian Conflict 
 Housam Darwisheh 
October, 2017. 
The Kurds form the largest non-Arab and 
predominantly Sunni ethnic minority in Syria. At 
more than 2 million people they make up 10 to 
12 percent of the Syrian population. The Kurds 
have their own distinct language and history 
dating back thousands of years. The Kurds in 
Syria and other neighboring counties have been 
highly oppressed and marginalized since the 
formation of the nation states in the Middle East 
after World War I. With the consolidation of Arab 
nationalist states, the Kurds had very little space 
to organize for their cultural, political and 
economic rights. Arab nationalism aimed at 
consolidating the state by unifying Arabic-
speaking Sunni and Shi’a but excluding non-
Arab minorities. Syria’s Arab nationalism also 
assumed the Arabization of minorities such as 
the Kurds. The Kurds were seen as a threat to 
“Arab unity.” Fearing the regime’s repression, 
Kurdish political parties, which dated back to 
1957, operated in secrecy. 1  Moreover, the 
discovery of major in oilfields in Kurdish areas 
in 1957 heightened the Syrian regime’s fear of 
Kurdish separatism. Thousands of Syrian Kurds 
were classified as non-citizen foreigners and as a 
result they could not own property or obtain 
government jobs while tens of thousands were 
not recognized officially and had no identity 
cards.2  
 
Inspired by the autonomy enjoyed by Iraqi Kurds, 
the Kurdish populated areas in eastern Syria 
experienced major unrest in in 2004. Massive 
demonstrations took place in Kurdish cities but 
they confronted the army and other security 
                                                        
1 Christian Sinclair and Sirwan Kajjo, “The Evolution of Kurdish Politics in Syria,” MERIP, August 31, 2011. 
2 Michael M. Gunter. 2014. Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War, Hurst and Company, London. UK. 
3 “Syria: Address Grievances Underlying Kurdish Unrest”: https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/03/18/syria-address-
grievances-underlying-kurdish-unrest (accessed October 1, 2017) 
forces who killed tens of Kurds, injured hundreds, 
and detained around 2,000 (Human Rights Watch, 
March 18, 2014). 3  The unrest led to further 
repression of the Kurds’ cultural and political 
expressions.    
 
Compared to their counterparts in Turkey and 
Iraq, the Kurdish population in Syria received 
less attention before the Arab uprisings of 2010-
2011. However, the Kurds have emerged from 
the Syrian civil war as a major power player 
under the leadership of Democratic Union Party 
(PYD) led by Salih Muslim and its armed wing, 
People's Protection Units (YPG) that are closely 
linked to the guerilla fighters of Kurdistan 
Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey. In fact, the 
PYD was established in 2003 by former militants 
of the PKK of Syrian origin in northern Iraq. 
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Three major factors lie behind the rise of the 
Syrian Kurds. The first is the Syrian civil conflict 
and the resulting weakening of the unitary central 
government of the Asad regime. The second is 
the support the Syrian Kurds receive from the 
USA and other Western governments for their 
role in the fight against the Islamic State. The 
third is the Kurds’ ability to govern and rule in 
Kurdish areas and cities captured from the 
Islamic States (ISIS).  
 
The Kurds in the 2011 Syrian Uprising  
 
The Syrian uprising against the Asad rule has 
evolved into a complex war for rival internal and 
external actors. The war made Syria a failed state 
and many sub-state actors took over. Syria 
became a breeding ground for jihadists, rebel 
groups and other foreign militias fighting 
alongside the regime forces. As a result, many 
Syrians sought protection within their ethnic, 
religious and sectarian groups. The failed state 
exacerbated conflicts over territorial control 
between actors trying to advance their alternative 
projects for Syria and its future. The 
disintegration of the Syrian state as a whole 
strengthened Kurdish nationalist and separatist 
aspirations in Syria’s northeast region. Thanks to 
their experiences under Asad’s repressive 
policies and the backing of the PKK military 
commanders, the Kurds were better than other 
opposition groups at organizing and defending 
themselves.  
 
Almost seven months into the Syrian uprising 
against the Asad rule, Kurdish National Council 
(KNC) was formed in Erbil as an umbrella 
opposition group under the sponsorship of the 
president of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
of Iraq, Massoud Barazani.4 The KNC stressed 
Kurdish identity within a larger Syrian landscape. 
In August 2013, the KNC joined the Syrian 
National Council. The KNC’s rival, PYD, 
however, had pragmatically struck a deal with 
the Asad regime by which the regime spared the 
Kurdish areas of destruction while the PYD’s 
police (Asayish) suppressed anti-Asad 
                                                        
4 “The Kurdish National Council in Syria,” Carnegie Middle East Center: http://carnegie-
mec.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=48502 (accessed October 3, 2017).  
demonstrations. Hence, the PYD was allowed to 
rule. In 2012, Asad offered concessions to 
convince the Kurds to stay out of the uprising. 
He issued a decree granting nationality to tens of 
thousands of stateless Kurds in Syria’s eastern 
Hasaka region. Later in the same year the Asad 
government withdrew its forces from a large 
territory along the Turkish border. This move 
allowed the PYD to take administrative and 
military control of Efrin, Kobani, and al-Jazeera, 
collectively named Western Kurdistan (Rojava in 
Kurdish). It also allowed Asad’s security forces 
to concentrate on the opposition elsewhere and 
sow dissention among anti-government groups. 
The regime also calculated that the Kurdish 
presence on the Turkish border would complicate 
the Turkish government’s efforts to arm and 
work with anti-Asad forces. 
 
In fact, the PYD-Asad relations date back to the 
1980s and 1990s when former Syrian president 
Hafez al-Asad supported PKK’s insurgency 
against Turkey. Many PKK’s fighters held Syrian 
citizenship and Asad’s support of PKK allowed 
PYD members to gain years of experience in 
organizing and fighting the Turkish state. At the 
start of the Syrian conflict, therefore, the PYD 
was better off its Kurdish rivals since its strong 
party structure and military wing (YPG) enabled 
the PYD to impose order and security in the areas 
it controlled, and pursue a pragmatic approach 
towards the uprising, the regime, and regional 
and international actors.  
 
Shortly after the Russian government announced 
a partial withdrawal from Syria in March 2016, 
the PYD declared the formation of a democratic 
federalism by building a semi-autonomous 
region and centralizing governance in the three 
Kurdish majority areas of Western Kurdistan, in 
northeast Syria along the Turkish border. The 
democratic federalism drew from the political 
vision of PKK’s founder and leader, Abdullah 
Ocalan, who has been imprisoned in Turkey 
since 1999. Since taking control of these areas, 
the PYD drafted a constitution, held elections, 
and established numerous local councils. To gain 
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international recognition and support, and to 
appease Turkey, PYD denies having 
organizational links with PKK which is 
designated a terrorist organization by Turkey, 
USA, and many other Western governments. 
Without a political settlement, however, the 
Kurds’ self-declared autonomous region has not 
been recognized by any local, regional or 
international power, and might become a new 
site of fighting whether the Asad regime departs 
or not. While it is predominantly Kurdish, 
Rojava is an ethnically mixed region with a 
sizeable Arab Muslim and Christian minority. 
Moreover, Syria’s Kurdish region contains large 
oilfields, notably in Rumailan and Suwaidiyah, 
which might spark future conflict over energy 
security and the distribution of wealth among 
social forces in the region. 
 
The PYD and the Fight against ISIS 
 
The rise of the Syrian Kurds has strong regional 
and international dimensions. As Turkish-Syrian 
relations reverted to enmity in the aftermath of 
the Syrian uprising, the Asad regime decided to 
allow the PKK and PYD to operate inside Syria. 
On its part, Ankara hosted the Free Syrian Army 
and the Syrian Muslim Brothers. As in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the Kurdish question arose as a 
bargaining chip against Turkey.5   
 
In fact, the YPG, is considered to be the most 
effective force fighting ISIS and Al-Qaeda in 
Syria. For almost a year ISIS tried to seize 
Kubane (Ain al-Arab in Arabic) in northern Syria 
near the border with Turkey. The battle for 
Kubane was important for the international 
community. With US support, the Kurds made 
sure Kubane did not fall into the hand of ISIS. In 
January 2015, ISIS was defeated and lost 
hundreds of fighters there. Since then the 
Kurdish forces, estimated at 20,000 in Syria, are 
the most trusted in the USA-led anti-ISIS 
coalition due to their ability to stabilize and 
                                                        
5  Marwa Daoudy. 2016. The Structure-Identity Nexus: Syria and Turkey’s Collapse (2011), Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 29 (3): 1074-1096. 
6 Emily Burchfield. February 7, 2017. “PYD Governance in Northeastern Syria,” Syria Source, Atlantic Council.  
7 “Under Kurdish Rule: Abuses in PYD-Run Enclaves of Syria,” June 19, 2014 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/06/19/under-kurdish-rule/abuses-pyd-run-enclaves-syria (accessed October 1, 2017).  
8 “Syrian Kurdistan mission opens in Moscow,” Russian TV. February 10, 2016: https://www.rt.com/news/332077-
govern areas taken from ISIS.6 The PYD has 
increasingly emerged as a key Western ally with 
regional influence. 
 
However, there is not much trust between the 
Kurdish forces and the local populations. There 
is strong sentiment among the local population 
that the Kurds have expanded at the expense of 
the local population because the Kurds have their 
own political project of establishing a separatist 
autonomous region. This may lay the 
groundwork for future ethnic conflicts between 
Kurds and Arabs. Furthermore, Human Right 
Watch has documented human rights abuses in 
PYD-controlled areas. 7 To bridge the mistrust 
between the Arabs and Kurdish forces, and to 
separate (at least in theory) the YPG and the PKK, 
so that it can continue arming the YPG, the USA 
created a joint Arab-Kurdish-Syriac Christian 
force at the start of the Battle of Kubane in 2014. 
The USA recruited more than 3,000 Arabs to join 
a 2,000 Kurdish forces in the so-called Syrian 
Democratic Forces (SDF) that is dominated and 
controlled by the Kurdish YPG. The PYD is well 
aware that it needs other international partners in 
case the defeat of ISIS results in a scaling back 
of US support for PYD. By balancing its 
relations with the Syrian regime, Russia, and 
USA, the PYD has been able to bolster its 
military capabilities and insulate itself against 
direct aggression from Turkey.  
 
In fact, like USA, Russia views PYD and YPG 
as the key to fight groups, such as Ahrar al-Sham 
and al-Nusra, that oppose the Syrian regime. The 
PYD’s cutting of the Aleppo-Turkey connection 
enabled the Syrian regime to regain control of 
eastern Aleppo in July 2016 with the support of 
the Lebanese Shi‘it group Hezbollah, Iraqi and 
Iranian Shi‘it militias and Russian airstrikes 
(Reuters, December 14, 2016). Russia has 
offered Rojava a significant amount of military 
assistance and the PYD’s leader visited Moscow 
where he opened a PYD representation. 8 
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Russia’s draft constitution for Syria clearly backs 
the Kurds’ demand for a decentralized Syrian 
state and the empowerment of local councils.9 
Although Russian denied it, the PYD claimed in 
March 2017 that Russia was setting up a military 
base in northeastern Syria and would train PYD 
fighters (Ekurd Daily, March 20, 2017).  This 
move brought Russia and USA, otherwise 
international rivals, to the PYD’s side. By 
helping the PYD to fight against ISIS, Russia 
demonstrates that it also fights terrorism at the 
international level. By supporting the PYD in 
Syria, Russia can also intervene in Turkey’s 
“Kurdish problem” by establishing a direct 
connection with the PKK through the PYD.  
The PYD-controlled Rojava is important to 
Russia for three main reasons: 1. It gives Russia 
permanent leverage in Syrian politics; 2. It 
provides Russia with permanent troop bases; and, 
3. Rojava’s proximity to Turkey provides Russia 
with leverage against Turkish president, Rajab 
Tayeb Erdogan. 10  These reasons explain 
Russia’s insistence on including the PYD in 
intra-Syrian peace talks in Geneva and Turkey’s 
firm opposition to PYD’s presence in peace talks 
between the opposition and the Asad regime.  
 
The Syrian Kurds’ Self-Rule  
 
The PYD has been one of the main non-state 
beneficiaries of the civil war in Syria and the 
fight against ISIS and other Islamists. Indeed, the 
Syrian Kurds practically operate on their own 
beyond the control of Asad or any other Syrian 
force. With its new local councils elected on 
September 22, few days before the Kurdistan 
independence referendum was held on 
September 25, 2017, the PYD has de facto self-
rule in Rojava. Its next step is to elect the first 
regional parliament in early 2018. 
 
Many Kurds in northern Syria celebrated their 
neighbors’ independence referendum while 
Syria’s foreign minister, Walid al-Muallem, 
stated that the Syrian government was open to 
negotiations with the Kurds over their demands 
for autonomy within Syria’s borders (Reuters, 
September 26, 2017). Yet, while the Kurdistan 
independence referendum have stoked Syrian 
Kurds’ nationalist aspirations, they realize that if 
they seek independence, they will have to expect 
military confrontation with Turkey, which 
conducted military operations against the PYD in 
northern Syria over the past few years and might 
launch outright invasion. In fact, Syrian rebel 
groups, Asad, and Syria’s neighboring states 
oppose the breakup of Syria or any threat to the 
territorial integrity of the existing states. For that 
matter, both USA and Russia oppose Kurdish 
independence while USA and Western states may 
not maintain post-ISIS support for the Syrian 
Kurds. Consequently, retaining autonomy may 
be the Kurds’ most pragmatic and practicable in 
the coming years. 
 
(Finish writing 14 October, 2017) 
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